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JUDICIAL LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK.
"Judicial Legislation" in the opprobrious sense of the term, has
been described as comprehending "judicial decisions which construe
away the meaning of statutes, or find meanings in them that the leg-
islature never intended." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawles Re-
vision 1897, see "Judge-Made Law"). In colloquial professional
parlance, however, the phrase is given a wider scope, being often
employed to characterize cases in which a court, disregarding the
rule, stare decisis, has sought to do what it conceived to be justice
on the facts. The tendency towards judicial arbitration, as distin-
guished from the scientific administration of the law, has been
noticeable in most American State courts during the past few de-
cades; there certainly has been a very marked development of the
tendency in the courts of New York. It has been a professional
by-word in that State for many years that, no matter what the result
in the courts below and no matter what the condition of the
authorities, it was good policy to appeal any unsuccessful case having
decided merits to the court of last resort. Besides equitably adjust-
ing particular controversies, the New York Court of Appeals has
shown a disposition towards directly usurping the legislative prov-
ince, that is towards the original effectuation of contested principles
of public policy, the administration of important arbitrary classifica-
tions, even the formulation of comprehensive rules of conduct and
business. It is proposed in this paper briefly to summarize a few
extreme, though typical, instances.
A beginning may be made-at first glance perhaps somewhat
paradoxically-with a case in which the Court of Appeals disre-
garded the scientific demands of legal development, not through
innovation, but by adherence to the stare decisis rule. In Marlin
Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, (i71 N. Y. 384), it was held that false
and malicious attacks upon a product of manufacture published in a
magazine, for which the manufacturer has no remedy at law because
of his inability to prove special damage, are, nevertheless, not the
subject of equitable cognizance and their future publication cannot
be restrained by injunction, because that would amount to an injunc-
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tion against a libel. According to the facts admitted on the de-
murrer the letters complained of, ostensibly coming from outside
persons and which contained what purported to be statements of
fact as well as criticisms upon the plaintiff's merchandise, were
"sham letters, written and published by defendant in furtherance
,of a design to force plaintiff to advertise with him, or, failing in that,
to gratify his malice." This decision leaves the law of the state in
an anomalous condition. The courts of New York, in common
with other American courts, go to great lengths in enjoining
-unfair competition through indirect deception, such as simulating
other persons' trade marks or names, the wrappers upon their mer-
chandise, etc. But when it comes to unfair competition by direct
lying a plaintiff is remediless. This decision was made by a divided
court and it reversed the Appellate Division, which was in favor of
granting the injunction. In view of the many instances in which
the Court of Appeals has ignored or expressly repudiated the obliga-
tion of stare decisis, some of which are hereafter cited, it would be
idle to contend that the underlying policy of the decision was mere
general conservatism. It seems highly probable that the real reason
was a conviction on the part of the majority of the judges in the
highest tribunal that the scope of the remedy of injunction should
not be further extended but arbitrarily limited. It is true that it
had been the rule of the common law for a long period that an in-
junction would not lie to prevent the publication of a libel. The
historical reasons for this rule, especially as to libels against persons,
are well known and their force has largely disappeared. The
Marlin Fire Arms case raised no question of personal defamation,
and it is submitted that the way was entirely open to hold that,
although a libel per se might not be enjoined, a malicious and
mendacious form of business warfare would be prevented, although
incidentally it involved a libel against a thing. This would have
been analogous to the position taken by many courts that, while an
injunction would not issue against crimes as such, the fact that acts
injurious to property also constituted crimes would not protect them
from equitable intervention. Some of the injunctions granted by
various courts against boycotting and other forms of Labor warfare
incidentally restrained acts of defamation as well as crimes. It is
well known that during the past few years there has been consid-
erable agitation against "government by injunction." Certain pop-
ular factions have been jealous of the right to enforce judicial
mandates by contempt proceedings without trial by jury. Legis-
lation has been advocated to circumscribe and define that power of
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the courts. Many prominent and conscientious members of the bar,
in different sections of the country and of all shades of political
affiliation, have exerted their influence in favor of the movement.
We cannot but regard the arbitrary limit set upon the natural devel-
opment of the law by the New York Court of Appeals as sympathetic
with and effectuating an extra-judicial sentiment.
The next illustration involved a substantial disregard of stare
decisis, and incidentally, as a pretext, the introduction oi an
independent principle stretched in its application to the point of
absurdity. Probably all American lawyers are more or less familiar
with the elevated railroad litigations in the city of New York, which
have resulted in the payment by the railroads of millions of dollars
as damages. The principle which was settled, after most elaborate,
argument by counsel and careful deliberation by the Court of Ap-
peals, was that the building of an elevated strtkcture in the streets
of a city, although not solid but resting on supports separated by
wide intervalg, and the operation of trains thereon, did not constitute
a legitimate street use; that the rights of light, air and access of
abutting owners, independently of whether they or the city owned
the fee of the streets, were substantial property rights, protected by
the constitution and which could not be taken without compensation;
that the road was a trespasser and that it might be enjoined from
maintaining its structure and continuing operation until it had made
compensation.
In Fries v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., (169 N. Y. 27o ) ; Muhlker v.
N. Y. etc., R. Co. (173 N. Y. 549), and Sauer v. City of New York,
(180 N. Y. 27), it was held by the same court that a steam railroad
or a municipal corporation, acting under statutory authority and
direction, without being obliged to make compensation, might be
permitted to construct and use an elevated viaduct in a street, which
more seriously invaded-indeed almost entirely destroyed-the ease-
ments of light, air and access. The pretext referred to was derived
from Radcliff's Executors v. The Mayor, (4 N. Y. I95), which was
a change of grade case, and the doctrine of which, though applying
to a veritable change of grade, has been repudiated in many juris-
dictions because of its manifest injustice. It would seem that
nothing further is required to characterize these late decisions than the
statement that a majority of the Court of Appeals with a straight
face classified a viaduct as a change of grade. The decisions were
not made without serious dissent both by the courts below, which
were overruled, and in the Court of Appeals itself. The brief dis-
senting opinion of Vann, J. of the Court of Appeals in the Sauer
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case, given below in a note, sufficiently indicates what should have
been held, according to legal consistency and common sense.' The
real explanation of the decisions quite clearly was the supposed
necessity of saving municipalities and certain classes of common
carriers from the operation of legal principles previously declared.
The third illustration is furnished by the decision in Matter of
Totten, (179 N. Y. 112). In that case the Court of Appeals, after
the manner of a legislature or a codifying committee, formulated
the following proposition of law:
"A deposit in a savings bank by one person of his own money, in
his own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not
establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It
is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies,
or until he completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act
or declaration, such as a delivery of a pass book, or notice to the
beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without
revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the
presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the bal-
ance remaining on deposit at the death of the depositor."
This decision has been widely commented upon by legal journals
and, so far as the writer is aware, has been unanimously disapproved.
It is inconsistent with earlier authorities in the State of New York
It introduces a serious anomaly into the law of trusts; indeed, a
trust that is revocable at the will of the creator can hardly be said
to be a trust at all. It impugns the policy of the statute of wills, by
permitting a disposition of property to take effect only after death,
without following the testamentary requirements. On the other
hand, as a piece of constructive legislation the decision could hardly
be too highly praised. It effectuates a custom which has grown up
among the humbler classes of people who, in placing their money
on deposit in trust for other persons, often intend to retain the right
to use it, principal as well as interest, during life, but that whatever
remains at the time of death shall go to the cestuis que trust. Under
1"I dissent upon the ground that the construction by a municipal cor-
poration of a new and independent street in the form of a bridge 5o feet
high and 63 feet wide, extending lengthwise through block after block
over an existing street, which, graded and paved for years, is left undis-
turbed except by the huge columns supporting the elevated structure, is
neither the improvement of the street as a street, nor a proper street
use sanctioned by precedent, or coming within the reasonable contem-
plation of the parties when the fee of the surface street was acquired
from the abutting owner, who has no access to the aerial street from
his own premises; and when this-is done without compensation it is a
taking of private property for public use in direct violation of the Con-
stitltion."
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the law as it stood the estates of depositors, who as trustees had
drawn money from accounts, would be liable to refund the same to the
cestuis que trust. The validation of the business custom in question
seems so unobjectionable, indeed so desirable, that the writer -has
on various occasions advocated the enactment of a statute on just
the lines laid down in the Matter of Totten. He did not believe that
a court would venture upon such a radical innovation and it is diffi-
cult to justify it as an exercise of judicial power.
The last example to be cited is the case of Griffin v. Interurban
St. Ry. Co., (I79 N. Y. 438). This decision affords perhaps as
serious an instance of judicial legislation as could be discovered.
It involves the nullification of the express language of a statute
by "construction" and also expressly disregards the rule, stare
decisis. The Act in question (section io4 of the Railroad Law)
imposes a penalty "for every refusal" to comply with the require-
ment to issue transfers to passengers. In spite of this unmistakably
clear language, and the fact that in construing similar language
in other statutes the court had recognized the intention to provide
for cumulative penalties, it was held that only one penalty could be
recovered in a single action for refusal to give a transfer, and that
the institution of the action is to be regarded as a waiver of penalties
previously incurred. The opinion contains the following naive
language:-
"Referring once more to the language of section io4 of the Rail-
road Law imposing the penalty, we find the single sentence in which
it is contained opening with the words 'for every refusal to comply.'
"It is quite obvious that the legislative intention to permit the
recovery of cumulative penalties for refusals of the defendant to
comply with the provisions of the Railroad Law in regard to the
transfer of passengers is as clearly manifested as in any of the cases
cited.
"Notwithstanding this fact, a majority of my brethren are of
opinion that while the rule for the recovery of cumulative penalties,
as already adverted to is firmly established by the early decisions of
this court, yet the changed conditions in our modern life in great
cities render its modification imperative."
In a paper on "The Doctrine of Stare Decisis," read at the Section
of Private Law of the Congress of Arts and Sciences, at St. Louis,
in September, i9o4, and published in the Michigan Law Review for
December, i9o4, (3 Mich. L. Rev. 89), the Hon. Edward B. Whit-
ney, now of the New York bar, shows the causes and explains the
processes that are tending to break down the stare decisis rule as a
scientific method of legal development. There is in the first place
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the enormous quantity of reports of decided cases. "The President
of the American Bar Association in 19o2, in his annual address to
the Association, stated that the law reports of the then past year
contained 262,000 pages and estimated that a man by reading ioO
pages a day might go through them in eight years; by which time
there would be new reports on hand sufficient to occupy him for
fifty-six years more." This torrent of literature is, of course, the
result of the vast, ever increasing bulk of litigation, so that with
the accumulation of precedent there is constantly less and less
possibility of examining and digesting it. Mr. Whitnpy remarks :-
"Nevertheless the judges and the bar and community at large have
all continued nominally to treat the doctrine of stare decisis as still
in full force; and, with all the modern difficulties in their way, so
many judges stand bravely by it that the citizen must always be pre-
pared to have it enforced against him in a given case with a rigidity
and technicality that would have been quite improbable in the days
when time permitted the precise state of facts and the precise line of
reasoning underlying each previous authority to be more carefully
analyzed, and tacit limitations to the breadth of its statements recog-
nized. On the other hand, as the wilderness of authorities presented
upon the briefs of counsel tends every year to become more hopeless,
the courts in general tend more and more to decide each case accord-
ing to their own ideas of fairness as between the parties to that case,
and to pass the previous authorities by in silence, or dispose of them
with the general remark-one of those remarks that the recording
angel is supposed to overlook-that they are not in conflict. Differ-
ent men, however, are of different minds. As the time spent upon
oral argument and subsequent consideration of each case tends to
lessen, the chances of difference in decision of two substantially simi-
lar cases coming before different sets of judges, or even before the
same judge in different years, tends to increase. Apparent conflicts of
authority thus arise. Subtle distinctions are taken in order to recon-
cile the conflict if possible. The law is thrown into doubt, and a
lawyer thereafter cannot advise his client how to act in order to enjoy
his rights and keep out of harassing litigation. The point in conflict
reaches the court perhaps again and again, and distinctions grow
subtler and subtler, until once in a while a happy solution is found by
holding that some then comparatively recent case, although avowedly
but distinguishing the earlier ones in some incomprehensible manner,
really overruled them. Thus for a moment the doctrine of stare
decisis fails to operate, and by its failure the law is clarified, reason
triumphs, useless litigation ends, and the citizen learns how in one
contingency to protect his rights."
In this condition of affairs judges indulge the delusion that they
are observing stare decisis merely because they cite precedents. The
truth is that, much in the same manner that expert witnesses are
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procurable to give almost any opinions that are desired, judicial
precedents may be found for any proposition that a counsel, or
a court, wishes established, or to establish. We are not living under
a system of scientific exposition and development of abstract prin-
ciples, but, to a large degree, under one of judicial arbitration, in
which the courts do what they think is just in the case at bar and cite
the nearest favorable previous decisions as pretexts. More and more
our vast accumulation of case law tends to dwindle in authority and
assume the vitual status of opinions of the Jurisconsults under the
system of the Civil Law. The special object of the present paper is to
call attention to an aggravated form of the tendency, which naturally
appears to its fullest extent in a State, like New York, where there is
the largest number of courts and the greatest volume of litigation.
The Court of Appeals has followed the policy of judicial arbitration
of private controversies for many years. It has now developed the
disposition to act as an independent and creative law-giver-to
engage in what, from any point, must be termed judicial legislation.
A great deal of casuistry and verbal hair-splitting has been ex-
pended in attempts to define the precise function of the courts as
law-makers. In a striking passage in his "Ancient Law," Sir Henry
Maine contends that every time a court renders a new decision on a
common law point, thereby modifying or extending the canon of the
precedents, the process is one of "virtual legislation." Cases are
readily imaginable in which a court, acting entirely on a common
law basis, might be compelled to essay legal creation. In Industrial
& General Trust Co. v. Tod, (i8o N. Y. 215), Judge Vann, speaking
for a majority of the Court of Appeals, said: "The common law
will not halt or surrender because the situation is novel and the
ordinary methods of proving values are not available, but will resort
to some practical means that will be just to both parties."
Even if we imagine an entirely novel controversy, arising out of,
say, a new invention or discovery, as to which there is no statutory
regulation, a common law tribunal could not turn the parties out of
court for lack of law. The court would proceed to adjudicate the
rights of the litigants, resorting to analogies from such precedents as
were deemed most nearly applicable. Here, indeed, would be a
signal illustration of "virtual legislation."
While none of the attempted definitions of judicial law-making
power may' be satisfactory, its general nature is well understood.
The courts constantly are required to make new law, but in so doing
they should proceed by development and extension of settled prin-
ciples. Radical departures from existing rules, abrupt changes
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of law, arbitrary discrimination between substantially analogous
states of facts, should be made only by a legislature; and constitu-
tions forbid special legislation even by the representatives of the
people unless some legitimate basis of class distinction is made to
appear. When-as has been shown to have been done in New York
-a court lays down broad rules of public policy; applies one
principle to one class of litigants and the opposite principle to
another class, though the circumstances are the same; formulates
affirmative rules of right and remedy for special kinds of property or
business; changes the statute law radically because in its judgment
the legislature has been ill-advised, or tardy in heeding the voice of
reform; then certainly it may be said that the province of the
legislature has been usurped. The disposition of the* respective
departments of an American government to self-aggrandizement by
encroachment upon the rightful domain of other departments is well
recognized, and, on the whole, the legislative department has been
the chief aggressor. But in the broad field of boundless opportunity
afforded by the litigation of New York, its judiciary may be seen
to have manifested the same tendency on quite an elaborate scale.
The present writer concurs with Mr. Whitney in the view that
"codification is the one and only remedy that has ever been suggested
which amounts to more than the merest palliative, and which has
received substantial support from any influential section of the
profession' and the public." An authoritative canon, recognized
by the bench and the bar as the law, is the only possible corrective
of discretionary judicial arbitration and of the further developed
spirit of judicial lawlessness, exemplified in important phases of
judicial legislation. In 1886 the American Bar Association by a
small majority adopted a resolution that the principles of substantive
law, so far as settled, should be reduced to a statutory form. On
the other hand, at about the same time, the New York City Bar
Association voted down by a large majority even the proposal to
codify the common law on special subjects, to be taken up one at
a time. Undoubtedly a large proportion of the American bar still
disapproves of the policy of codification and the attitude of the bar
of the city of New York has been very influential. There the oppo-
sition to codification has been led by certain very able, very dis-
tinguished men, whose convictions were unquestionably sincere.
The arguments of these gentlemen, cogently put as they were, would
not, however, have so overwhelmingly prevailed, if the rank and
file of the profession had not had constantly before their eyes the
horrible example of the New York Code of Civil Procedure. To
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the average New York lawyer the word "code" is apt to bring up
overshadowingly the awful calamity of a Practice Act, with its
hundreds of sections of statute and its thousands of decisions con-
struing them. The disastrous result of elaborate and exact codifica-
tion of a subject as to which it never should have been attempted,
has been artfully used to discredit the entire policy. As a matter of
fact, codification of substantive law, piecemeal, has been very fre-
quently successful in New York and elsewhere. The original
Revisers of the New York Statutes codified the subject of Trusts
and Powers, rendering simple and clear a branch of the law there-
tofore very complex and recondite. Their work stands today, and
scarcely anyone would deny that that particular piece of codification
has been a great boon to the public. The Negotiable Instrumients
Law is a conspicuous example of successful codification, both as
respects inter-state uniformity, and intra-state certainty of the law.
Mr. Whitney believes that codification will be accomplished within
the lifetime of men already admitted to the bar, but not "until the
present system has become so overloaded that the American bar
with substantial unanimity will decide that almost any kind of
codification would be an improvement." The immediate duty of
observant and thoughtful lawyers would seem to be to encourage
the codification of separate topics as opportunity occurs, and to
promote belief in the efficacy of the general policy.
Two additional suggestions may be offered. During what is to be
regarded as a transitional stage in our jurisprudence, it will be of
great practical service to the bar and the public if the judiciary will
take to heart the recent language of Chief Judge Cullen, in his con-
curring opinion in Rosseau v. Rouss, (i8o N. Y. 116):
"I concur in the opinion of Judge Vann that Eva Rosseau, the
mother of the plaintiff, was the party under whom the plaintiff
claimed, and therefore, under section 829 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, not a competent witness to personal transactions between her-
self and the .defendant's testator. I think, however, that no sound
distinction can be drawn between this case and our decision in
Bouton v. Welch, i7o N. Y. 554, 63 N. E. 539. It is true that in that
case the defendant released her dower by joining in the execution of
the deed by her husband. But the trial court found that the agree-
ment out of which the defense arose was made by the plaintiff's tes-
tator, not with her, but with her husband. No matter what ground,
however, the case might have been decided upon, as a matter of fact
it was actually decided on the proposition that where a third person
sues on a contract made for her benefit she does not derive her interest
from the party who furnishes the consideration for said contract.
We are now about to hold the exactly contrary doctrine, and I think
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it but fair to the profession that under such circumstances we should
expressly retract the Bouton Case, not seek to distinguish it, or leave
is as a false light to deceive the unwary."
The profession has become so accustomed to "distinctions" that
did not distinguish, to casuistical discussion for the sake of preserving
the appearance of consistency, that Judge Cullen's words are most
grateful.
Second: The movement which some time since gathered consid-
erable strength, for the suppression of dissenting opinions, should
be entirely abandoned. The writer has been pleased to notice a
recent reaction in sentiment upon this subject. Two of the leading
American legal periodicals' lately have published well considered
articles advocating the continuation of the practice of reporting
dissenting opinons. It may for the present be conceded that, with
an ideal policy of legal development under the stare decisis doctrine,
dissenting opinions would be objectionable as casting uncertainty
upon the law. But, according to existing conditions, the legal "cer-
tainty" obtainable from a decision by a bare majority amounts to
a species of Fool's Paradise. Knowledge of the views of the
minority may be of material aid in casting the probabilities of the
court's action in another case with slightly different facts.
Wilbur Larremore.
1. 14 Yale Law Journal (Feb., 19o5), 191; 39 American Law Review,
(Jan.-Feb., 1905), 23.
